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WHEN TUNA STILL ISN’T ALWAYS TUNA: 
FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY REGIME 
CONTINUES TO INADEQUATELY ADDRESS 
SEAFOOD FRAUD 
Stephen Wagner∗ 
In 2012 alone, Americans consumed approximately 4.5 billion 
pounds of seafood, over 90% of which was imported.1  Simply put, 
Americans eat a lot of seafood, with upwards of 500 different species 
available to satiate the demand.2  Consequently, imported and domestic 
seafood in the United States is a thriving 80.2 billion dollar market,3 with 
certain highly desired species of fish fetching steep prices.4 
One fundamental assumption of the consumer-driven market is that 
the label on the seafood correctly identifies the species of seafood, 
thereby, among other things, justifying the market price.  It is 
increasingly clear, however, that this assumption is often not the case for 
seafood: many consumers are awakening to the upsetting and dangerous 
reality that the premium-priced, ecologically-certified, wild Atlantic 
salmon they ordered at the restaurant or picked up at the grocer is 
perhaps the much less-expensive and arguably unsustainable farm-raised 
                                                     
 ∗ J.D., magna cum laude, University of Maine School of Law, 2015; B.A. College 
of the Atlantic, 2011. 
 1. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. (NMFS), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN. (NOAA), FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 2012 3-4 (Alan Lowther, ed. 2013), 
available at http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/commercial-fisheries/fus/fus12/.  
 2. OR. STATE UNIV., CORNELL UNIV., UNIVS. OF DEL., R.I., FLA. & CAL. & THE CMTY. 
SEAFOOD INITIATIVE, SEAFOOD CHOICES: OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. SEAFOOD SUPPLY 1 
(2011), available at http://seafoodhealthfacts.org /pdf/seafood-choices-overview.pdf . 
 3. Benjamin Friedman, Mystery Fish, CONSUMER REPORTS, Dec. 2011, available at http:// 
www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/december/food/fake-fish/overview 
/index.htm.  
 4. See, e.g., Patrick Boehler, Japan: World’s Most Expensive Fish Sold for $1.8 
Million, TIME, Jan. 7, 2013, available at http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/01/07/japan-
worlds-most-expensive-fish-sold-for-1-8-million/ (“a 222-kilogram bluefin tuna was sold 
at Tokyo’s Tsukiji market for an all-time high of 155.4 million yen, or 1.8 million 
dollars”).  
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salmon;5 or that their sashimi ahi tuna, prized for its delicate flavor and 
light flesh, is potentially the snake mackerel, a species of fish whose oils 
are known to cause severe gastrointestinal problems.6  
The dilemma consumers face is seafood fraud:7 the substitution, 
misrepresentation, or mislabeling of a species of seafood that has become 
progressively prevalent with the increase of globalized trade, consumer 
demand for seafood, increased consumer demand for sustainably-sourced 
seafood, and the availability of reliable and inexpensive DNA technology 
that can test the flesh of the food item to determine its species and 
origin.8  Whether seafood fraud is intentional or unintentional, it is an 
economic, environmental, and food safety harm.  Particularly because of 
the severity of the threat to food safety, this comment examines the 
adequacy of the existing federal regulatory regime addressing seafood 
fraud, specifically focusing on potential impacts of the Food Safety and 
Modernization Act (FSMA) on seafood fraud.  
Part I of this comment explores what exactly seafood fraud is and the 
negative impacts this has on the economy, the environment, and human 
health. Part II lays out the different federal agencies responsible for 
regulating seafood fraud and briefly analyzes the agencies’ attempts to 
address the problem.  Part III summarizes the origin and scope of FSMA 
and highlights potential new powers and opportunities it gives the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) for addressing seafood fraud.  Finally, 
part IV concludes that even with FSMA, there remain significant 
problems with the current food safety regime that inhibit real action on 
                                                     
 5. See, e.g., Sarah Zielinski, Seafood Sleuthing Reveals Pervasive Fish Fraud in New 
York City, NPR: THE SALT (Dec. 11, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt 
/2012/12/11/166981454/seafood-sleuthing-reveals-pervasive-fish-fraud-in-new-york-city. 
 6. KIMBERLY WARNER, WALKER TIMME, BETH LOWELL, & MICHAEL HIRSHFIELD, 
OCEANA STUDY REVEALS SEAFOOD FRAUD NATIONWIDE 16 (2013), available at 
http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/National_Seafood_Fraud_Testing_Results_FI
NAL.pdf (“Escolar, or oilfish (Lepidocybium flavobrunneum), is not actually a tuna 
species at all, but is instead a snake mackerel that contains a naturally occurring toxin, 
gempylotoxin. This toxin can cause mild to severe gastrointestinal problems even for 
some who eat only a few ounces of the fish. Because of the health problems associated 
with escolar, Italy and Japan have banned it, several other countries have issued health 
advisories for it and the FDA advises against the sale of it in the U.S.”). 
 7. Author uses the term seafood “fraud” in the non-tortious sense, acknowledging 
that not all misrepresentation or species substitution constitutes intentional fraud. 
 8. Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Studies, A New Fish DNA Test Could Help in the 
Fish Against Illegal Fishing, ENV’T 360 DIG., ( May 13, 2011), available at 
http://e360.yale.edu/digest/a_new_fish_dna_test_couldhelp_in_the_fight_against_illegal_
fishing/2942/ (“An international consortium has developed a DNA test that can trace the 
origin of fish and fish products, an innovation that could improve enforcement of marine 
fisheries laws and reduce overfishing worldwide.”). 
2015] When Tuna Still Isn’t Always Tuna 113 
 
addressing seafood fraud on the federal level and discusses other 
potential alternative approaches, including Senator (then Representative) 
Ed Markey’s recently re-introduced Safety And Fraud Enforcement for 
Seafood Act (SAFE Seafood Act). 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SEAFOOD FRAUD 
Many recent studies and investigations, by both government and 
non-profit watch groups, have found extensive fraud, misrepresentation, 
and species substitution in fish and other forms of seafood.  From 2010 
to 2012, Oceana,9 a non-profit organization advocating for international 
ocean conservation, conducted one of the largest of such investigations, 
gathering more than 1,200 seafood samples from 647 retail outlets in 21 
states to determine if they were honestly labeled. 10 Oceana’s DNA 
testing found that one-third of the samples analyzed were mislabeled 
according to FDA guidelines, with red snapper and tuna having the 
highest rates of fraud.11 Further, Oceana found that 44 percent of retail 
outlets sampled sold food that tested positive for fraud; it also identified 
“which types were the worst (sushi venues) and best (grocery stores) in 
honestly labeling seafood according to federal guidelines, with these 
patterns being repeated everywhere [it] sampled in sufficient numbers.”12 
In 2012, the Consumers Union of the United States published a 
report in the Consumer Reports magazine about an investigation by The 
National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)13 into alleged 
seafood fraud.14  NOAA sent out both fresh and frozen samples obtained 
                                                     
 9. OCEANA, Protecting the World’s Oceans, http://oceana.org/en/about-us/what-we-
do (“Oceana, founded in 2001, is the largest international organization focused solely on 
ocean conservation”) (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 10. WARNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 4; Gretchen Goetz, Looking Upstream: Seafood 
Traceability in a Global Economy, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 20, 2013), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/looking-upstream-seafood-traceability-in-a-
global-economy/#.VPCndodxtUQ. 
 11. WARNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 25. 
 12. Id. (explaining that this may be due to the stricter private regulations and practices 
addressing seafood fraud at large, chain grocery stores).  
 13. NMFS Seafood Inspection Program is responsible for the development and 
advancement of commercial grade standards for fishery products, health and sanitation 
standards in the industry, and for inspecting, evaluating, analyzing, grading, and 
certifying services to interested parties. Memorandum of Understanding Between FDA 
and NOAA on Seafood Inspections (Nov. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstanding
MOUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm201263.htm; NOAA, Seafood Inspection Program, 
http://www.seafood.nmfs.noaa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).  
 14. Friedman, supra note 3, at 11. 
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from a retail location to an outside lab for DNA testing, where 
“researchers extracted genetic material from each sample [of fourteen 
types of fish] and compared the genetic sequences against standardized 
gene fragments that identify its species in much the same way that 
criminal investigators use genetic fingerprinting.”15 The results found 
“more than one-fifth of 190 pieces of seafood [NOAA] bought at retail 
stores and restaurants in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut were 
mislabeled as different species of fish, incompletely labeled, 
or misidentified by employees.”16 
Members of the press have also not been shy about shining a light on 
seafood fraud, even conducting investigations of their own.17  
When Consumer Reports tested 23 supposedly wild-caught salmon fillets 
bought nationwide in 2005-2006, only 10 were wild salmon and the rest 
were farmed.18 In 2004, University of North Carolina scientists found 27 
percent fish labeled red snapper was not in fact red snapper.19 In 2008, 
the Chicago Sun-Times tested fish at 17 sushi restaurants and found that 
fish being sold as red snapper actually was mostly tilapia.20  
A 2011 investigation of fish from over 134 restaurants in 
Massachusetts by the Boston Globe “showed that Massachusetts 
consumers routinely and unwittingly overpay for less desirable, 
sometimes undesirable, species – or buy seafood that is simply not what 
it is advertised to be. In many cases, the fish was caught thousands of 
miles away and frozen, not hauled in by local fishermen, as the menu 
claimed.” 21 In its investigation, confirming the results of Oceana and 
NOAA, the Boston Globe found all 23 white tuna samples were escolar, 
not white tuna, and 24 out of 26 red snapper sampled was actually a less-
                                                     
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weise, Something Fishy? Counterfeit Foods Enter the U.S. 
Market, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-
01-19-fake-foods_N.htm. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Jean Abelson & Beth Daley, On the Menu, But Not on Your Plate: A Globe 
Investigation Found Fish Bought At Restaurants Across the Regions Was Mislabeled 
About Half the Time. Sometimes it Was Innocent Error, But Often the Switch Was 
Deliberate, Driven by Profits, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2011, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2011 
/10/22/dnatest/NDbXGXdPR6O37mXRSVPGlL/story.html [hereinafter Abelson 2011]. 
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prized species.22 Despite legislative action on the state level following 
this report, a follow-up report a year later revealed similar results.23 
Disturbing as this may be, adulteration or misrepresentation of food 
has been around for as long was people have purchased food; be it lead 
in water or chalk and bones in bread, fraudulently misrepresented or 
adulterated food products have a long history. 24 
However, there are not many recorded instances of adulteration of 
seafood.25  This is likely because, prior to modern technology and global 
trade, seafood consumption was largely confined to coastal fishing 
communities, where consumers bought directly from the fisherman and 
could probably themselves identify the species of fish.26  
With increased globalization and urbanization, as well as advanced 
technology allowing transportation of seafood beyond the coastline, 
seafood is more susceptible to such tactics. In Swindled: The 
Dark History of Food Fraud, From Poisoned Candy to Counterfeit 
Coffee, author Bee Wilson theorizes that the emergence of modern food 
fraud can be traced to the impact of the industrial revolution and laissez-
faire economics on the food industry in 19th century England.27 She 
explains that, as the medieval guild system gave way to urban merchants, 
caveat emptor became the governing rule for the buying and selling of 
food, thus “[foisting] huge responsibility on a population that lacked 
even basic democratic rights.”28 Wilson similarly contends that food 
fraud and adulteration in the United States was exasperated by the 
advancement in food science and shift in food production from home to 
factory.29  
                                                     
 22. Id.  
 23. Jean Abelson & Beth Daley, Many Mass. Restaurants Still Serve Mislabeled Fish, 
BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/12/02 
/dnasidebar/SAe6PdZMRqi6mZUDOdWz7M/story.html [hereinafter Abelson 2012]. 
 24. See generally BEE WILSON, SWINDLED: THE DARK HISTORY OF FOOD FRAUD, FROM 
POISONED CANDY TO COUNTERFEIT COFFEE (Princeton University Press, ed. 2008) (an 
excellent resource that explores the history of food fraud, from the leaded wine of the 
ancient Romans to modern food frauds like the Chinese milk powder scandals and 
dubious organic food labels) [hereinafter Wilson]. 
 25. See Abelson 2012, supra note 23 (“Throughout much of the last century, the cold 
waters off New England supplied fresh fish that was delivered daily to Massachusetts 
restaurants and other businesses.”).  
 26. Id. 
 27. WILSON, supra note 24, at 19-34. 
 28. Id. at 95. 
 29. See Michael T. Roberts, Cheaters Shouldn’t Prosper and Consumers Shouldn’t 
Suffer: The Need for Government Enforcement Against Economic Adulteration of 100% 
Pomegranate Juice and Other Imported Food Products, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 189, 204-
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Today, economically-motivated adulteration of food can be defined 
as the “fraudulent addition of nonauthentic substances or removal or 
replacement of authentic substances without the purchasers’ knowledge 
for economic gain of the seller.”30  Food fraud is a broader term “that 
encompasses the deliberate substitution, addition, tampering, or 
misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging, or false 
or misleading statements made about a product for economic gain.”31  
Seafood fraud is a form of food fraud. It can take the form of species 
substitution,32 whereby a lower-quality and less expensive fish is 
mislabeled as a more desirable and more expensive species.33  Fillers and 
other substitutes may be used on processed seafood products for similar 
reasons.34  Also, seafood fraud may include transshipment to avoid 
duties,35 over-treating,36 short-weighting, and other forms of mislabeling 
and misrepresentation.37  However, this fraud is not always, intentional.38  
                                                                                                                       
06 (2010) (laying out a history of the U.S. regulatory response to food adulteration at the 
turn of the 20th century). 
 30. Jeffery C. Moore, John Spink & Markus Lipp, Development and Application of a 
Database of Food Ingredient Fraud and Economically Motivated Adulteration from 1980 
to 2010, 77 J. FOOD SCI. R118, R118 (quoting J. Devries, US Pharmacopeia’s Food 
Ingredients Intentional Adulterants Advisory Panel. Presented at USP’s 2009 Food 
Ingredients Stakeholder Forum, http://www.usp.org/pdf/EN/stakeholderforum 
/foodadditives/Aug2009/2009-08-04FISFPresentationspdf.pdf(slides 80-91)). 
 31. John Spink, Defining Food Fraud and the Chemistry of the Crime, in IMPROVING 
IMPORT FOOD SAFETY 195, 196 (Wayne Ellefson, Zach Lonra, Darryl Sulliven, eds. 
2013). 
 32. GAO-09-258, SEAFOOD FRAUD 8 (2009) [hereinafter GAO-09-258] (species 
substitution occurs when “participants in the seafood supply chain . . . label a species of 
seafood as another species. Typically, a lower-market-value species is labeled as a 
higher-market-value species to realize a larger profit. This results in consumers paying 
too much for the product.”). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 8-9 (“Foreign producers may ship seafood products on route to the United 
States through a third country to avoid import duties by labeling the product’s country of 
origin as the third country and also to avoid regulatory controls such as FDA import 
alerts.”).  
 36. Id. (explaining over-treating is a technique whereby processors may, for example, 
over-bread prepared seafood products, use water-retaining chemicals, or over-glaze with 
an ice covering to artificially increase the weight of seafood products without indicating 
the true net weight of the seafood on the label.).  
 37. Spink, supra note 31, at 9 (giving as examples the providing wrong information 
and commingling of two or more different products with different values that are then 
sold as one product at the higher price). 
 38. Goetz, supra note 10 (quoting LeeAnn Applewhite, CEO of Applied Food 
Technologies, “It’s extremely complicated because fishermen go out, and grouper don’t 
swim in one place all by themselves and cod in another place all by themselves,” she 
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Rather a species could merely be mislabeled, incompletely labeled, or 
misidentified by employees at retail stores or restaurants.39  This is 
distinct from such condoned practices in the seafood industry such as the 
re-branding of less desirable species, which is often harmless to the 
health and safety of consumers and perhaps beneficial in replenishing 
depleted fish stocks.40 
A.  The Three Major Effects of Seafood Fraud 
Although most intentional seafood fraud may be motivated purely by 
economic gain,41 and so is consequently not thought of beyond its 
economic harm dimensions, the intentional or unintentional effects are 
broader. 
1.  Economic Concerns 
Seafood fraud is an economic harm.  The consumer is often 
negatively impacted because when one higher-valued species is 
substituted for another, the consumer is nearly always the one paying the 
price.42 “[S]wapping a lower-cost fish for a higher-value one is like 
ordering a filet mignon and getting a hamburger instead.”43  
For example, several investigations found seafood fraud is very 
common in sushi restaurants where favored species can fetch exorbitant 
prices.44  One common example is the substitution of the more expensive 
                                                                                                                       
explained. “You have all these species swimming together and they catch thousands of 
fish on some of the big boats. They look alike, they’re in the same place, and once they’re 
filleted, nobody can tell the difference.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Andrea Migone & Michael Howlett, From Paper Trails to DNA Barcodes: 
Enhancing Traceability in Forest and Fishery Certification, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 421, 
431 (2012). 
 41. Moore et al., supra note 30, at R119. 
 42. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3 (“Prices range widely, even for the same type of 
fish, but be suspicious if fish is supercheap. For what turned out to be real grouper steaks, 
we paid $6.80 and $9.99 per pound. The ‘grouper steaks’ that were really pollock and 
tilefish cost us just $4.99 and $5.60 per pound, respectively.”). 
 43. Dan Flynn, Oceana Study: ‘Fish Fraud’ Ripping Off American Consumers, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013) (quoting Oceana’s follow up report to the initial 
investigation).  
 44. Dustin Cranor & Amelia Vorpahl, Oceana Study Uncovering Widespread Seafood 
Fraud Nationwide 33% of Seafood is Mislabeled in Grocery Stores, Restaurants, and 
Sushi Venues (Feb. 21, 2013), http://oceana.org/en/news-media/press-center/press-
releases/oceana-study-uncovers-widespread-seafood-fraud-nationwide (“While 44 
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red snapper for the bland-tasting, farmed, less-expensive tilapia.45 In its 
2012 follow-up study to the 2011 report exposing rampant fish fraud, the 
Boston Globe visited, for example, “Symphony Sushi — selected by 
Boston Magazine as one of the city’s best neighborhood restaurants in 
2010 — [where] a $15.95 crispy red snapper meal turned out to be 
tilapia.”46 Similarly, samples taken from the Boston Children’s hospital 
determined that “the fish sandwich described by a cafeteria clerk as cod 
tested as less-expensive pollock.”47 Also, “instead of ‘fresh Boston cod’ 
promised on the menu, Jerry Remy’s Seaport served Pacific cod, which 
is often previously frozen, cheaper, and hauled thousands of miles to 
New England.”48 
Fish fraud is also bad for business. A study by the Grocery 
Manufacturers Association found that the cost of food fraud to the food 
industry alone is $10 to $15 billion per year.49  Seafood fraud damages 
the domestic seafood industry when domestic fisheries are undersold by 
foreign fisheries that gain an unfair economic advantage by mislabeling 
in order to evade tarrifs and sell inferior products at inflated prices.50 
2.  Environmental Concerns 
Second, seafood fraud can indirectly harm the environment because 
misinformation affects a consumer’s choice, which may be based on 
social or environmental concerns, undermining the consumer’s reasons 
and future motivation for paying a higher price.51  For example, in the 
case of the over-fished red snapper, substituting or mislabeling the 
species makes it difficult for a consumer to recognize over-fishing when 
                                                                                                                       
percent of all the retail outlets visited sold mislabeled fish, sushi venues had the worst 
level of mislabeling at 74 percent.”). 
 45. Goetz, supra note 10 (Other in-demand fish for which a different species is 
commonly substituted like cod, grouper, halibut and Chilean seabass.). 
 46. Abelson 2012, supra note 23. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Ass’n Food, Beverage, and Consumer Products Companies, Consumer Product 
Fraud: Deterrence and Detection 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.gmaonline.org/downloads/research-and-reports/consumerproductfraud.pdf. 
 50. See, e.g., Nicole Lou, Bait and Switch: the Fraud Crisis in the Seafood Industry, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/bait-
and-switch/388126/. 
 51. WARNER ET AL, supra note 10, at 26-27 (“With no effective accountability in the 
seafood supply chain, fish obtained by illegal and unregulated means are finding an easy 
and entry onto our dinner plates profitable.”).  
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she sees the species as a readily-available item at restaurants.52 As 
Oceana campaign director Beth Lowell said, “if people see something on 
the menu all the time, they may have no idea it is disappearing from the 
ocean.”53 This undermines systems put in place in order to promote 
sustainable fisheries, like ecological labeling, that rely on proper species 
identification to drive demand in such a way as to beneficially impact 
fisheries and the environment.54  If the consumer were to discover the 
deception, her faith in the brands may be disrupted.55 Another 
environmental harm may arise with seafood fraud when fisheries 
regulators rely on species labels on imported and domestic fish to set 
catch limits and conserve fisheries.  For example, “The Globe-sponsored 
testing showed that yellow fin tuna wontons at the chain restaurant ‘Not 
Your Average Joe’s’ in Westborough were filled with chunks of southern 
blue fin tuna.”56  That’s a critically endangered species, according to the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, a worldwide 
environmental network of governments, scientists, and nonprofits.”57 
3.  Food Safety Concerns 
Third, food safety concerns are raised when food is adulterated.58 
Seafood fraud is a significant threat to a safe food system.  As stated by 
FDA, “in the interest of public health, it is vital that both domestically-
processed and imported seafood is safe, wholesome, and properly labeled 
. . . there are numerous potential health risks associated with misbranding 
seafood species.”59 In the United States, fifteen percent of documented 
foodborne illness is due to seafood contamination.60 Misidentification or 
adulteration can lead to foodborne illness because certain species have 
specific care requirements that, when not followed, may cause foodborne 
                                                     
 52. Abelson 2011, supra note 21.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. See id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Moore et al., supra note 30, at R119 (“in essence, the safety of the whole food 
supply chain collapse into a singular factor, the criminal. Only he or she has enough 
information to know the extent of the hazard introduced into the food supply chain.”). 
 59. DNA-based Seafood Identification, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/DNASeafoodIdentification/default.htm 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
 60. Ching-Fu Lin, Global Food Safety: Exploring Key Elements for an International 
Regulatory System, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 637, 639 (2011). 
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illness for certain people.61  Further, many species substitutes contain 
higher levels of mercury, an element that should be generally avoided in 
high quantities or by individuals more sensitive to its negative effects 
because of pregnancy, age, etc.62  For example, NOAA found that some 
of the falsely-labeled grouper was in fact tilefish, a species that contains 
three times the amount of mercury.  Worth mentioning again, and even 
more severe, is when tuna is substituted by escolar, also known as snake 
mackerel.63  Although similar in appearance, escolar is not in the same 
family as tuna, sells for 20% less, and the FDA advises against its 
consumption because the fish contains an oil known to cause severe 
gastrointestinal problems.64 In 2007, fish fraud made the news when 
imported puffer fish, containing a deadly toxin, was mislabeled as 
monkfish and many consumers became severely ill.65  
More health hazards may arise when the country of origin is 
misidentified. Many people are allergic to certain species of fish because, 
for example, fish from a hazardous area may then be unknowingly sold 
or consumed.66  
                                                     
 61. Goetz, supra note 10 (found a histamine-containing fish, catfish, substituted for 
grouper, a species that looks similar but does not require the same post-harvest treatments 
to avoid histamine; high histamine levels can cause illness). 
 62. In a 2008 study by the New York Times, writers tested over 20 stores selling sushi 
in Manhattan and found that a “regular diet of six pieces of sushi a week would exceed 
the levels [of mercury] considered acceptable by the Environmental Protection Agency.” 
Marian Burros, High Mercury Levels Are Found in Tuna Sushi, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/dining/23sushi.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. A 
further alarming fact in the study was that owners of the sushi stores did not know that 
the fish posed a risk to consumers. Id.; WARNER ET AL., supra note 6.. 
 63. Jacob H. Lowenstein, George Amato & Sergios-Orestis Kolokotronis, The Real 
Maccoyii: Identifying Tuna Sushi with DNA Barcodes – Contrasting Characteristic 
Attributes and Genetic Distances, 4 PLOS ONE 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjour
nal.pone.0007866&representation=PDF. 
 64. Beth Daley & Jenn Abelson, From Sea to Sushi Bar, a System Open to Abuse, 
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 24, 2011) (in response, the distributer claimed that there is no 
difference between the fish, stating “[w]hite tuna and escolar are the same species,’’ he 
said, “[w]e use both names.”). 
 65. FDA, FDA NEWS RELEASE, FDA WARNING ON MISLABELED MONKFISH: FISH 
BELIEVED TO BE PUFFER FISH; CONTAINS DEADLY TOXIN (May 24, 2007), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108920.htm. 
 66. Goetz, supra note 10, at 3 (discussed as an example fish sold with an inaccurate 
label could have been fished in an area flagged for Ciguatera, a toxin found in some 
tropical reef fish, or Vibrio, formed in shell fish when waters are too warm); WARNER ET 
AL., supra note 6. 
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Another food safety threat from seafood fraud is that at least half of 
the imported seafood is from aquaculture production.67  Although 
aquaculture is safe in many cases, the potential danger here is that 
seafood grown in confined aquaculture areas can have high rates of 
bacterial infections, so growers may treat them with antibiotic and 
antifungal drug agents in order to increase their survival rates.68  The 
residue from these drugs can remain in the fish after harvesting and 
processing, which then means it can be consumed.69  These drugs “have 
been linked to cancer, severe allergic reactions, and increased antibiotic 
resistance.”70  As aquaculture imports continue to increase, so does this 
potential risk.71 
Despite this evidence, seafood fraud is not often considered a food 
safety issue. A mere skimming of the titles of news reports included in 
this comment reveals that the emphasis is often placed on the economic 
impact to the consumer or the market. As this article will discuss, the 
FDA, despite having the authority to inspect imported fish to protect 
against seafood fraud, places very few resources on detecting food fraud 
because, one could argue, the FDA does not view this as a serious 
enough food safety concern to devote sufficient resources.72  Therefore, 
this comment concludes that greater emphasis on the legitimate food 
safety implications of seafood fraud may be the most effective strategy to 
focusing the existing regulatory regime and resources on addressing 
seafood fraud.  
While it is evident seafood fraud is happening, it is less certain at 
which point in the chain from “hook to fork” this is occurring.73  For 
example, Oceana conceded that “because [their] study was restricted to 
seafood sold in retail outlets, [they] cannot say exactly where the 
                                                     
 67. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-286, SEAFOOD SAFETY: FDA 
NEEDS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF IMPORTED SEAFOOD AND BETTER LEVERAGE LIMITED 
RESOURCES, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Report 11-286]. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 7. 
 73. The phrase “hook to fork” is commonly used in food and fishing literature and 
generally refers to the adaption of the terrestrial local food culinary movement to seafood. 
Harry Hurt III, Dinner, From Hook to Fork, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/business/20pursuits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. It 
can also refer to a risk-based approach to food safety that traces the different stages of the 
food chain system and examines the practices and procedures. European Food 
Information Council, Farm to Fork (Jun. 2006), http://www.eufic.org/article/en/food-
safety-quality/farm-to-fork/expid/review-farm-to-fork/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).  
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fraudulent activity occurred.”74 Part of this difficulty stems from the fact 
that many hands will touch the seafood along this chain, making nearly 
impossible with current laws and technology to determine where exactly 
the fraud occurred. 75 After harvesters catch the seafood, they ice or flash-
freeze, and it is then sometimes transferred at sea to larger vessels, where 
it may be mixed with other species.76  At this point, the seafood may then 
be processed at sea, which includes removing the heads and guts in order 
to delay spoilage, making identification all the more difficult.77  
“Unscrupulous people may try to falsify documentation or hide illegally 
caught fish with legally captured ones, resulting in mislabeled fish 
ending up at supermarkets and restaurants.”78  
II. THE CURRENT FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY REGIME’S REGULATION 
OF SEAFOOD FRAUD 
The difficulty in detecting and addressing seafood fraud is 
compounded by the inadequacy of the current federal regime regulating 
the safety of seafood.  This comment focuses on the federal level; any 
discussion of reform logically should begin at the point where the 
majority of seafood enters the U.S. market.  Attempts to address seafood 
fraud at the local and state level have been largely unsuccessful.79  That 
said, several proposals exist to address seafood fraud at the local, state, 
international, and private sector levels, which could be complementary to 
federal regulatory reform.80 
The current federal food safety regime is an inter-tangled web of 
conflicting agency objectives and redundancy; commentators often 
criticize the U.S. food safety system for having both a lack of 
coordination and a lack of adequate funding.81  The often-repeated 
                                                     
 74. WARNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.  
 75. Friedman, supra note 3. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Abelson 2011, supra note 21. 
 80. See generally Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Combating 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud, 79 Fed. Reg. 75537 
(proposed Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force] 
(submitting for public comment recommendations for implementing strategies for 
addressing seafood fraud that include local, state, federal, and international proposals); 
Ching-Fu Lin, supra note 60 (identifies the essential elements of successful global 
regulation of food safety). 
 81. See, e.g., Nathan M. Texler, “Market” Regulation: Confronting Industrial 
Agriculture’s Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 323 (“As aforementioned, 
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example of the food safety regulation of the all-too-familiar-to-law-
students pizza illustrates the situation:  
The FDA regulates frozen pizza, but the USDA takes over if it is 
topped with two percent or more of meat or poultry. Therefore, 
inspections at these facilities follow two different sets of 
guidelines issued by the FDA and the USDA. Therein lies the 
rub: the USDA inspects facilities that make pepperoni on a daily 
basis and then inspects the plants that produce 
pepperoni pizza every day, whereas the FDA will inspect 
cheese pizza facilities once every ten years. The difference is 
astounding, especially considering certain froze 
pepperoni pizza products – despite receiving more inspections 
than given to cheese pizza – were recalled in 2007 due to 
possible E. coli O157:H7 contamination.82 
The regulation of seafood fraud is no exception; there is no single 
agency regulating seafood fraud on the federal level, the agencies that do 
regulate it do not often cooperate, and funding is scare.83  This section 
examines the historical background of the food safety regime in order to 
give context to its regulation of seafood fraud. It then reviews each 
agency’s role in addressing seafood fraud, identifies its active and latent 
regulatory authority, and analyzes its respective shortcomings and 
common criticism in regards to addressing seafood fraud.   
A. Historical Background of the Modern Food Safety Regulatory Regime 
This article does not attempt to provide a historical analysis of the 
food safety regime, a topic thoroughly covered in food and drug law 
literature.84  Nonetheless, a brief summary of how the modern food safety 
regulatory regime in the United States came about is necessary to place 
the current regulation of seafood sale and distribution, and the fraud 
thereof, in context.   
The United States’ first attempt to address the growth of adulteration 
and food safety issues in general was the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, 
an omnibus act passed largely in reaction to a string of expository 
journalism of the widely-read finding of Upton Sinclair in his expository 
                                                                                                                       
the federal food safety bureaucracy is a maze of responsibility, which understandably 
makes it difficult for agencies to communicate and proceed along one common path.”). 
 82. Id.  
 83. See GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32. 
 84. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 29. 
124 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1 
 
piece, The Jungle.85  This was followed in 1930 with the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), largely creating FDA in its modern form.86  This 
pattern of separate, reactionary laws eventually led Congress to create a 
“bifurcated system that foreshadow[s] the current confusion.”87  One 
scholar in this area explains that this chasm between food and food safety 
grew even greater when FDA was consolidated within the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS).88  As it stands now, “currently four 
agencies stand at the center of the morass: (1) the 
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS); (2) the FDA’s 
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CSFAN); (3) the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Prevention, 
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances; and (4) the Centers for Disease 
Control’s (CDC) Food Safety Office.”89  “No single agency or voice has 
the ultimate responsibility or authority to make the decisions necessary to 
assure the American public that what we eat will not make us sick.”90   
B. Current federal regime for seafood safety 
Three federal agencies play key roles in detecting and preventing 
seafood fraud: the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), the Department of Commerce’s National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and the FDA.91  Additionally, minor 
roles in regulating fish fraud are held by NOAA’s Office of Law 
Enforcement, the USDA, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).92 
Again, outside the scope of this article, but critical to full understanding 
of the overall regulation of fisheries, is the role of state, local, and 
international regulatory bodies. 93 
                                                     
 85. Texler, supra note 81, at 317. 
 86. See U.S. FDA., WHAT WE DO: HISTORY (2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (explaining that the 
FDA traces its history to 1848, making it arguably the oldest comprehensive consumer 
protection agency in the US federal government). 
 87. Texler, supra note 81, at 317. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Brandt T. Bowman, Roll Sushi, Roll: Defining “Sushi Grade” for the 
Consumer and the Sushi Bar, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 495, 509 (2011) (discussing the role 
of the Food Code at the local and state levels, writing that “FDA created the Code as a 
model to assist state and local governments in initiating and maintaining effective 
programs for the prevention of food borne illnesses.”); BETH DALEY & JEAN ABELSON, 
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1.  UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
Considering the predominance of imported over domestic seafood in 
the United States, CBP has a significant role in the regulation of 
imported seafood safety and the adulteration of imported seafood and 
seafood products.94  Broadly speaking, CBP collects import duties and 
tariffs, assesses money damages for the failure to redeliver imported 
products, and oversees the exportation or destruction of refused 
products.95  In terms of seafood, “CBP reviews seafood import 
documentation to detect schemes to avoid paying the appropriate custom 
duties as seafood products enter the country, among other things.”96 
Besides inspection, CBP operates a national statistical sampling program, 
known as the Compliance Measurement Program, “which randomly 
selects shipments of imports by commodity for review or examination to 
determine the degree to which they comply with trade laws and 
regulations.”97 Finally, CBP can assess penalties against a violating 
importer, which can range from two to four times the loss of lawful 
duties and fees.98 
CBP is, however, limited in its resources. For example, in 2008 CBP 
officials examined between approximately 1 to 2.4 percent of all seafood 
imports.99 Similarly, the Compliance Measurement Program in 2008 
examined only 766 seafood products out of nearly 400,000 imported.100 
Also, the fees are limited to enforcing violations of anti-dumping and 
tariff evasions, which are a limited fraction of the overall seafood fraud 
problem.101  
The overlap in authority between FDA and CBP on imported foods 
has been largely seen as positive.  Although technically, because of this 
overlap, an import found to be in violation by FDA could still be re-
exported for sale by CBP, in practice CBP complies with requests by the 
                                                                                                                       
ALI CLE COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAWS, ST036 ALI-ABA 103 (2012) (“Several states have taken matters into their own 
hands. Florida officials regularly inspect menus and compare them with invoices and 
boxes of fish in the restaurants. Proprietors found with misrepresented fish face fines of 
up to $800 and can have their restaurant license suspended or revoked.”). 
 94. ARTHUR N. LEVINE, FDA ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, ¶ 910 STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
OVER IMPORTS, 2004 WL 5032328. 
 95. Id.   
 96. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 2.  
 97. Id. at 6. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 8. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
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FDA for seizure.102  Further, FDA has worked with CBP to support a 
seizure under laws that give the authority to CBP, even though false 
entry declaration is also within the purview of the FDA.103  In short, 
“[t]he laws establishing FDA and Customs authority over imports give 
the two agencies flexibility in seizing violative imports.”104  
2. National Marine Fisheries Service 
NMFS has the ability to regulate seafood fraud through its voluntary 
fee-for-service inspection program, which inspects seafood purchases 
made by retailers, processors, distributors, and other firms in order to 
verify their net weight, ensuring that the species is identified correctly 
and not adulterated.105  This inspection addresses “economic integrity 
issues, such as the accuracy of a seafood product’s label, as well as 
seafood safety issues.”106 NMFS’s Quality Management Program enables 
the organization to apply Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HAACP) principles to food safety and economic fraud risks, helping 
identify measures that can prevent seafood fraud.107  
Overall, NMFS officials interviewed by GAO reported that they 
inspect approximately one-third of seafood consumed in the United 
States.108 NMFS officials reported that they had used these two functions 
to identify instances of seafood fraud, especially short-weighting, in both 
domestic and international facilities.109 NMFS reported finding species 
substitution through visual inspection and testing in NOAA’s National 
Seafood Inspection Laboratory.110 However, a GAO report in 2009 found 
that NMFS does not keep a comprehensive record of these inspections.111 
Further, FDA admitted it does not rely on these inspections.112  
                                                     
 102. Levine, supra note 94. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 4-5. 
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. Id. at 10. 
 108. Id. at 13. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 17. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 6. 
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3.  Food and Drug Administration 
While FDA’s legal authority comes from the FDCA and other laws 
briefly highlighted above, the FDA’s structure is a creation of 
administrative order and could, therefore, “be extinguished by the stroke 
of a pen.”113  Broadly speaking, in terms of addressing food fraud, 21 
U.S.C. § 371(a) sets out the general authority to the HHS to promulgate 
regulations for efficient enforcement of the FDCA.114 Section 331 
specifically prohibits the act or cause thereof of adulterated or 
misbranded food.115 Section 343 provides that food is “misbranded” 
when it is “false or misleading in any particular way,” it is “offered for 
sale under another name,” it has a “false or misleading label,” or is an 
“imitation of another food.” 116  Further, section 342 provides that a food 
shall be deemed to be “adulterated” if it “contains any poisonous or 
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health . . . if the 
quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it 
injurious to health.”117 Although the latter has not been used to address 
common types of fish fraud, courts have interpreted this broadly,118 
providing a potential source of authority for FDA to regulate fish fraud.  
Next, FDA derives its authority to regulate imports from 21 U.S.C. § 
381, which prescribes that a food may be refused entry into the United 
States if it appears to be manufactured, processed, or packed under 
unsanitary conditions or if it is adulterated or misbranded.119  The 2002 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
(known as the Bioterrorism Act) significantly expanded the authority of 
FDA to potentially regulate the food system to prevent and address fish 
fraud. 120 The Act dictates that food processors and handlers must be able 
to “identify the immediate previous sources and the immediate 
subsequent recipients of food.”121  The Act exempts restaurants and 
farms (including fish farms) from these requirements.122  Thus, “[w]hile 
                                                     
 113. RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER BARTON HUTT, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 20 (Foundation Press ed., 3d ed. 2007). 
 114. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012). 
 115. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). 
 116. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). 
 117. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2012). 
 118. See U.S. v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Containing Bireley’s Orange Bev., 187 F.2d 
967 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 119. 21 U.S.C. § 381 (2012). 
 120. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350c (2012)).  
 121. 21 U.S.C. § 350c (2012). 
 122. Id. § 350c(a)(1). 
128 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1 
 
this means seafood handlers must have a record of where they got a 
shipment of seafood and where they sent it, it does not affect the labeling 
that accompanies the food.”123 
The FDA has three responsibilities in the regulation of seafood: first, 
the FDA maintains a list of seafood names that is intended to help the 
industry correctly label products; second, it offers guidance to help 
seafood producers comply; third, FDA administers a HACCP program 
that requires seafood producers to identify and develop a process to 
mitigate biological, chemical, and physical hazards that are likely to 
occur.124 
First, the FDA maintains a list of seafood names that is intended to 
help industry correctly label products and ensure FDA inspectors identify 
mislabeled products.  The “Seafood List” compiles the scientific and 
market names for imported and domestic seafood in order to promote 
uniformity in the use of FDA-acceptable market names by the 
industry.125 In theory, this could be an adept tool at preventing species 
substitution, but the GAO found this list had not been updated 
substantially or made readily available to the public.126  Similarly, FDA 
also maintains an “import alert” list to detain “entries of imported foods 
that appear to have significant recurring violations.”127 However, the 
GAO found in 2009 that the FDA only physically examined a small 
amount, and, thus, the list is underutilized.128  
Second, the primary form of guidance offered by the FDA for 
seafood producers, as well as state and local governments seeking to 
create effective programs for seafood safety, is the Food Code.129 
Although the Food Code is not any form of legal authority,130 it is 
commonly regarded as the FDA’s best advice for creating “a uniform 
system of provisions that address the safety and protection of food 
offered at retail and in food service.”131   The Food Code does so by 
                                                     
 123. Goetz, supra note 10. 
 124. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 10. 
 125. Id. at 5.  
 126. Id.   
 127. Id. at 18. 
 128. Id. at 19. 
 129. FDA, FOOD CODE: 2013 RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
(2013) [hereinafter FOOD CODE], available at, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCo
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 130. Id. at i. 
 131. Food Code 2013, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
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providing “a model to develop or update their own food safety rules and 
to be consistent with national food regulatory policy.”132  Certain 
provisions are directly applicable to seafood. For example, Section 3-
402.11 “Parasite Destruction” recommends a freezing process for raw 
fish.133 However, the Food Code then subsequently exempts the freezing 
requirement from shellfish, shucked scallops, several tuna species, any 
aquaculture fish, and processed fish eggs.134  
Further, commentators point out other problems with the 
effectiveness of the Food Code, beyond its exemptions. First, state 
legislatures have not adopted or implemented the Food Code 
uniformly.135 Second, specifically in regards to sushi, the regulations do 
not require enough information be provided to consumers to allow 
consumers to make educated decisions.136  This further underscores the 
need of a uniform or cooperative federal regulatory effort to address 
seafood fraud.  
Third, FDA’s HACCP program requires seafood producers to 
identify and develop process to mitigate biological, chemical, and 
physical hazards that are likely to occur.137  Every processor is required 
either to conduct or have conducted a hazard analysis identifying likely 
safety hazards and establishing preventative measures that the processor 
can apply.138 The regulations further provide that every processor shall 
have and implement a written HACCP plan whenever a hazard analysis 
reveals one or more food safety hazards that are reasonably likely to 
occur.139 The HACCP must be specific to each processing location and 
each type or group of types of fish.140  
The HACCP plan can be understood in two steps.141  The first step 
under the plan is for the processor to identify and list food safety hazards 
that are likely to occur.142  Second, the processor is to list the “critical 
control points” for each of the hazards identified include those “designed 
to control food safety hazards introduced inside or outside of the 
                                                     
 132. Food Code, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/default.h
tm (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).  
 133. FOOD CODE, supra note 129, at § 3-402.11. 
 134. Id.§ 3-402.11(B). 
 135. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 93, at 511. 
 136. Id. at 512. 
 137. 21 C.F.R. § 120 et seq. (2012). 
 138. Id. § 123.6(a) (2012).  
 139. Id. § 123.6. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Bowman, supra note 93, at 507 (describing the program as two steps).   
 142. Id.; 21 C.F.R. §§ 123.6(b)-(c). 
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processing plant environment, which may include hazards that occur 
before, during, [or] after harvest.”143  In all, the HACCP plan must 
include a list of critical limits,144 monitoring procedures, corrective action 
plans, verification, and other miscellaneous administrative 
requirements.145  The processor is supposed to take the corrective action 
noted within the HACCP plan if they deviate from the plan.146 A failure 
to comply with this renders the product adulterated under section 
402(a)(4).147  
While some commenters proclaim the HACCP to be the best food 
safety system available,148 others identify clear shortcomings in the 
HACCP program.149  First, there are several issues of validation.150   
Further, there are specific shortcomings of the HACCP plan in 
addressing seafood fraud: under the HACCP program, FDA inspects 
domestic firms involved in the production, storage, and distribution of 
seafood to ensure that their HACCP plans are properly designed and 
being implemented.151  However, GAO found in 2009 that FDA agents 
spend “very little time” looking for seafood fraud.152  Specifically, only 
.5 percent of FDA inspections included searching for indicators of 
seafood fraud between 2003 and 2008.153  In regards to foreign importer 
inspections under the HACCP program, the GAO investigation in 2009 
found that FDA was inspecting only 61 out of 14,569 registered foreign 
seafood firms for indicators of seafood fraud.154  The GAO report found 
two potential reasons for this, aside from limited resources and a 
                                                     
 143. Id. § 342(a)(4); Bowman, supra note 93, at 507. 
 144. “Critical limit means the maximum or minimum value to which a physical, 
biological, or chemical parameter must be controlled at a critical control point to prevent, 
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 147. Id. § 123.6(g). 
 148. William H. Spurbur & Richard F. Stier, Happy 50th Birthday HACCP: 
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 149. Bowman, supra note 93, at 508. 
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 151. 21 C.F.R. §§ 123.6(b)-(c). 
 152. GAO Report 09-258, supra note 32, at 19. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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perception that this is not a food safety issue.155 The first is that FDA 
does not cooperate sufficiently with NMFS inspectors.156 Second, FDA’s 
HACCP regulations do not include measures to identify and mitigate 
economic fraud risks.157 
Overall, even with these major tools for addressing seafood fraud, 
FDA is not adequately addressing seafood fraud.  More specifically, less 
than 2% of fish imported to the US, within the jurisdiction of FDA, is 
inspected; although it may be detected incidentally, of that 2 %, only 
.05% is inspected specifically for seafood fraud.158 The one exception has 
been the progress FDA has made against certain importers who regularly 
adulterate food.159  Further, funding is limited. Gavin Gibbons, of the 
National Fisheries Institute, says that FDA has the authority to deal with 
species substitution and other types of fraud “but they basically don’t use 
it, saying essentially that that’s an unfunded mandate.”160 Due to the 
mismanagement of the Seafood List, and the limitations and voluntary 
nature of the guidance to industry and states, and the inadequacy of the 
HACCP program, consumers have little assurance that the seafood they 
purchase is correctly labeled, which presents an economic, 
environmental, and food safety problem.161 
                                                     
 155. Id. at 13 (“ FDA directs its field staff to minimize work on economic fraud issues 
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4. United States Department of Agriculture  
USDA regulates country of origin labeling for seafood products.162  
More specifically, much of the regulations focus on the distinction 
between farmed and wild-caught labels.163 However, commentators claim 
USDA did not create a strong labeling program in implementing this 
law: “[p]rocessed seafood is exempt, leaving more than 50% sold in the 
U.S. without labels; 90% of fish sellers, such as wholesale markets, are 
exempt; and no enforcement mechanism exists and violators face paltry 
fines.”164 Further, this does not seem to address mislabeling; for example, 
a 2005 study revealed that “wild-caught” salmon at six of eight New 
York City stores was actually farm-raised.165 Although obviously limited 
in scope, USDA also oversees the food safety of farm catfish.166 
5. Federal Trade Commission 
FTC is responsible for regulating whether seafood is being truthfully 
advertised, and has authority to regulate the context of seafood labeling, 
marketing, and advertising.167 Specifically, FDA and FTC share authority 
over the misbranding of fish.168  FTC derives this power from section 5 
of the FTC Act.169 FTC cannot seek civil penalties, but it may issue cease 
and desist orders.170  Similar to FDA’s guidance, FTC issues Green 
Guides that provide interpretive guidance on what might be considered 
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mislabeling under the FTC Act.171  However, “while the [Green Guides] 
provide important interpretive guidance for what may or may not be 
considered deceptive or misleading and receive deference from the 
courts, they are non-binding and occupy a deferred-to middle space 
between legally mandatory eco-labeling requirements and truly voluntary 
standards.”172 Nonetheless, cooperation between FDA and FTC in this 
area is encouraging and has led to successful detection and persecution 
of seafood fraud in some instances.173  
6. Collaboration Between Agencies is Limited 
Overall, aside from the specific issues addressed above with regard 
to each agency’s efforts, a common theme in the criticism by the GAO 
and other commentators is a lack of cooperation among the CBP, NMFS, 
and FDA to detect and prevent seafood fraud. Specifically, the GAO 
2009 report cited a lack of common goals in detecting and preventing 
fraud, and the agencies often gave similar or overlapping activities that 
“could be better coordinated to use limited resources more efficiently and 
effectively.”174  
This lack of collaboration leads to a lack of information sharing 
between agencies that could help each better detect and prevent seafood 
fraud.175 The 2009 GAO report found that: 
CBP collects information on seafood imports, such as product 
type, product quantity, and country of origin, through the review 
and examination of imported goods . . . . NMFS collects 
information in lot inspection reports that identify short-weighted 
domestic and imported products. FDA collects information on 
imported seafood products, such as the accuracy of product 
labeling, though entry document reviews, food label reviews, 
product examinations, inspections, and laboratory analysis. . . . 
However, these agencies have not developed procedures to 
identify or share useful information.176 
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By developing procedures for sharing information on importers and 
products, the GAO report concluded the agencies could increase 
inspections without additional resources.177  
Further, the report found inefficient overlaps.178 This was sometimes 
because the agencies were “not sure whether [they] can rely on NMFC 
inspections, in part due concerns about potential conflicts of interest.”  
This lack of collaboration occurred despite numerous memoranda of 
understandings between the agencies.179  
III.  FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT’S (FSMA) IMPACT ON THE 
REGULATION OF SEAFOOD FRAUD 
FSMA180 is perhaps the most significant legislative change to US 
food regulation since the introduction of the FDCA. In light of a series of 
well-publicized food illness outbreaks,181 as well as continuous criticism 
of the fragmented nature of food safety regulation in the US,182 Congress 
passed FSMA to significantly enhance the jurisdiction of FDA and close 
several notable gaps in the U.S. food safety system.183 
Broadly speaking, the following are the key provisions that expanded 
the power of the FDA: first, FSMA gives FDA the ability to mandate 
food safety measures at the farm level for fruit and vegetable 
production184; second, FSMA authorizes FDA to create HAACPs for all 
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food processing facilities185; and third, FSMA directs the secretary of 
HHS to “coordinate with the food industry to develop pilot programs to 
explore methods to more rapidly and effectively identify foodborne 
illness outbreaks.”186 Finally, FSMA expands the authority and power of 
FDA to regulate how food is introduced into interstate commerce.187 
Relevant to seafood fraud, FSMA provides FDA new authority to 
regulate imports and to oversee foreign import inspections.  For the first 
time, importers must verify that their foreign suppliers have adequate 
preventive controls in place to ensure safety, and FDA will be able to 
accredit qualified third party auditors to certify that foreign food facilities 
are complying with U.S. food safety standards. 188 FSMA required of 
FDA several actions within certain timeframes that relate to seafood 
safety.  For example, FSMA required that, within one year, FDA release 
a guidance document on mitigation strategies for protection against 
intentional adulteration.189  It also required FDA to designate high-risk 
foods for which additional recordkeeping would be “appropriate and 
necessary to protect public health,” and make this list available to the 
public.190  FSMA further mandated FDA update its Fish and Fished 
Products HACCP Guidance within 180 days.191  However, FDA only met 
the last of these three requirements within the established timelines.192  
Two FSMA provisions may have some chance of addressing seafood 
fraud more adequately than the current approach. First, the Foreign 
Supplier Verification Program that, as proposed, would require importers 
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subject to the rule perform certain risk-based activities to verify that food 
imported has been produced in a manner that provides the same level of 
public health protection as that required of domestic food producers.193 
This proposed rule will have little actual effect on addressing seafood 
fraud because FSMA exempts a facility already required to comply with, 
and is indeed complying with, FDA’s Seafood HACCP Program.194  
Second, as mentioned above, FSMA requires FDA designate high-
risk foods that would subject certain importers of seafood to higher 
recordkeeping requirements.195 Further, FSMA specifically requires FDA 
to direct inspection resources towards facilities that import high 
identified as high risk.196 As of 2014, FDA was still working to 
implement this provision, and seafood had yet to receive such 
designation.197 Even if FDA does designate seafood, the practicable 
effect again seems limited given existing recordkeeping requirements.198  
More broadly, FSMA has not been viewed in all that favorable of a 
light, with many unsatisfied food safety advocates claiming it is 
inadequate to address the problems plaguing the U.S. food system.199  
While it does fill some jurisdictional gaps and provide previously lacking 
mandatory recall authority, further calls for reform, particularly with 
seafood, are likely.  
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The fragmented approach to regulation has led to a lack of 
cooperation and insufficient inspections of imported seafood, which 
constitutes the majority of seafood consumed in the US.200 Although 
FDA is the agency with the most significant authority and ability to 
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regulate seafood, FDA does not appear to perceive that this is a 
significant issue and, perhaps consequently, devotes few resources into 
investigating seafood fraud.201  Even national calls for funding FSMA 
mostly emphasize produce-related food illness.202  The SAFE Seafood 
Act, proposed by Rep. Ed Markey, offers several proposals that could 
address some of the problems raised in this comment. More recently, the 
Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud released for comment several 
proposed strategies for addressing seafood fraud and related issues. This 
section lastly explores how increasing the emphasis on food safety could 
build support for such action. 
A. SAFE Seafood Act 
Shortly following the Boston Globe investigation into seafood fraud 
in the greater Boston area, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) sent letters to the 
FDA, NOAA, and the FTC, inquiring about their oversight of seafood 
fraud.203 From the response from the agencies, Markey concluded that the 
“FDA has the lead responsibility for seafood safety and seafood labeling 
at the Federal level, but NOAA also has significant expertise and 
resources that could be utilized to address safety concerns.”204 Further, 
the responses indicated that the FRC is responsible for regulating 
whether seafood is being truthfully advertised.205 To Markey, “the 
responses to these letters indicated that the agencies could more 
effectively work together to combat the issue of seafood fraud.”206 
In response to these shortcomings, then representative, now senator, 
Edward Markey, D-MA, introduced 113 H.R. 1012, Safety and Fraud 
Enforcement for Seafood Act, a bill to strengthen federal consumer 
protection and product traceability with respect to commercially-
marketed seafood, and for other purposes, on March 6, 2013.207  
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The so-called SAFE Act contains proposals that may address some 
of the criticism of the current federal regulatory approach described 
above. The bill defines “seafood fraud” as the mislabeling or 
misrepresentation of seafood information required under this Act or other 
applicable federal laws and regulations.208 The Act may increase 
inspections of imported seafood by requiring that FDA inspectors also 
include seafood fraud in their inspections for seafood safety violations, 
requiring the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to execute a memorandum of understanding to 
improve interagency cooperation and establish procedures for increasing 
the number of local, state, and federal officials authorized to conduct 
seafood fraud and safety inspections and increasing cooperation between 
NOAA and FDA on said inspections.209 
The Act also has the potential to address the problem of standardized 
lists and data through two provisions: first, the Act requires HHS 
Secretary, in consultation with Secretary of Commerce, to update and 
improve its list of standardized names for seafood and ensure that the list 
is accurate and publicly available.210 Second, the Act requires data 
already required to be collected by U.S. fishermen on species, production 
method (gear type, farmed, or wild), geographic catch area, and weight 
or number of fish to stay with the seafood through processing, 
distribution, and sale, and requires equivalent data to accompany 
imported seafood.211 
However, the Act has received no subsequent legislative action after 
being referred to committee.212  That said, recent news suggests 
momentum and activism is continuing to build and support is coalescing 
behind Markey’s bill.213  For example, Robert Vanasse, the Executive 
Director of Saving Seafood, a nonprofit group funded by the domestic 
fishing industry, publicly noted how Congress is in a better position than 
states and localities to deal with seafood labeling because the “problem 
isn’t a local fisherman calling one thing something else,” he said.214 “It’s 
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imports being called domestic.”215  Further, Oceana’s ocean advocate 
Beckie Zisser said the group is hopeful the SAFE seafood bill will be 
approved, saying it has bipartisan support in Congress and regional 
support from groups around the nation, including fishermen.216 
B. Presidential Task Force 
In response to the investigations revealing seafood fraud and 
criticism of the current regulatory approach to addressing it, on June 17, 
2014, the White House released a presidential memorandum: 
“Establishing a Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud.”217 The 
established task force consists of representatives from most of the 
agencies discussed above and directed them to propose recommendations 
for implementing a comprehensive framework of integrated programs to 
combat seafood fraud.218  In early 2015, the task force recommended 
several strategies that generally call for increased cooperation between 
state and local U.S. agencies and international partners, and they also call 
for a risk-based traceability program.219   
Given that a lack of cooperation is one of the major reasons the 
current food safety regime inadequately addresses seafood fraud, a call 
for cooperation between not only federal agencies, but also between state 
and local players is encouraging.  Overall, the task force shows promise 
but requires a sustained effort by the President, implementation through 
executive orders or rulemaking, and funding.220  Further, the task force 
appears to be an effort coordinated by NOAA and the NMFS, agencies 
with which FDA has previously failed to collaborate effectively with 
regarding seafood import oversight.221  At the time of this comment’s 
                                                     
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Presidential Memorandum, Establishing a Comprehensive Framework to Combat 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud, GPO (Jun. 17, 2014), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400464/pdf/DCPD-201400464.pdf.  
 218. Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force, 79 Fed. Reg. at 75537. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Shiva Polefka & Michael Conathan, Fighting Fraudulent Fishing, Center for 
American Progress, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Oct. 9, 2014, available at 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/10/09/98640/fighting-
fraudulent-fishing/ (“Addressing these challenges will require sustained pressure from the 
highest levels to keep interagency partners focused and working constructively together, 
not simply protecting turf.”).   
 221. See supra Part II.B.3.  
140 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1 
 
publication, task force comments and recommendations were to be 
finalized sometime in early 2015.222  
In short, it remains unclear whether the proposals of the Act or the 
recommendation of the task force can address the problems raised above. 
Regardless of the policy strategy, this comment proposes that the key to 
gaining the resources and attention necessary to address the inadequacy 
of the current federal approach to seafood fraud is for advocates to 
change the conversation about seafood fraud effects from one of 
economic or environmental effects to the food safety threat.  FDA seems 
to give seafood fraud backburner treatment based on this mistaken belief 
this is not a food safety issue. A greater focus on the food safety aspects, 
particularly the risk to human health, will exert more pressure on FDA to 
take action using the tools it has so far neglected.  Recognizing a uniform 
approach is unlikely in the near future, this at least could build the 
coalition of support and energy needed to pass bills like SAFE that can 
help encourage agency cooperation.  Until then, consumers navigating 
the path from hook to fork may continue to struggle to know when tuna 
is tuna.  
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